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By Democratic Audit
Letting prisoners vote would undermine the idea that civil
liberties are fundamental to democratic citizenship
Parliament is currently considering how to relax the UK’s restrictions on prisoner voting, which have been
deemed in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights.  In one of two new contributions to the
debate – alongside Chris Bennett and Daniel Viehoff’s post -  Peter Ramsay sets out the democratic argument
against prisoner enfranchisement. He argues that enfranchising prisoners would foster the illusion that the
political rights enjoyed by prisoners can be on a par with those enjoyed by the free citizens of a democracy.
One idea lies at the heart of  the ef f orts of  penal ref ormers to persuade Parliament to comply with the
Strasbourg ruling that the UK must end its blanket ban on prisoners voting. That idea is that prisoners are
cit izens too. If  prisoners are ‘capable of  continuing with their lives as cit izens’ while incarcerated, as Nicola
Lacey puts it in her recent article on Democratic Audit UK, they should not be excluded f rom polit ical
participation or deprived of  the vote. Proponents of  enf ranchisement regard denying prisoners the vote as
one more aspect of  the f utile and unjust social exclusion that of f enders and ex-of f enders are generally
subjected to, and a blatantly undemocratic aspect at that. I can understand why they read
disenf ranchisement this way, given the banal ‘tough on crime’ posturing that saturates parliamentary and
media discussion of  the question. And I agree with them that harsh treatment of  prisoners does injustice
because prisoners are already being punished f or their of f ending by loss of  liberty. I also agree that harsh
and uncaring treatment of  prisoners is counter-productive because it makes addressing the causes of  their
of f ending more dif f icult. Nevertheless, I think enf ranchisers are wrong to argue that prisoners can continue
with their lives as cit izens.
At f irst glance, arguing f or the cit izenship of  of f enders appears to be democratic, promoting universal
suf f rage and the polit ical rights of  the marginalised. However, if  we look a litt le closer, we can see that the
enf ranchisers’ argument both undermines the def ence of  democratic f reedoms in the present and
represents a f undamental challenge to the idea of  the rule of  the people. Nor is it clear that
enf ranchisement will be an unambiguous advance f or the cause of  penal ref orm. Treating prisoners as
cit izens seems to undermine a key aim of  penal ref ormers: the goal of  achieving f ewer people in prison.
The central f law in the liberal idea that prisoners continue their lives as cit izens is that prisoners have had
their basic civil liberties taken away f rom them by the executive. The enf ranchisers’ argument, theref ore,
makes the claim that civil liberties are not an intrinsic aspect of  cit izenship in a democracy. For the
enf ranchisers, people continue to be capable of  living their lives as cit izens even if , like prisoners, they
have no right to go where they want, associate or assemble with whomsoever they wish to, in order to
express whatever opinion they hold, either in public or private, and to do so without executive interf erence.
The immediate danger in this idea should be obvious. If  prisoners do not need civil liberties in order to enjoy
democratic cit izenship, why do any of  us? At a t ime when protestors are routinely kettled, polit ical speakers
are prosecuted and the entire population electronically spied upon, the argument that civil liberties are not
necessary f or democratic cit izenship is, to put it mildly, not helpf ul to the def ence of  polit ical f reedom.
Of  course, it is true that some sort of  ‘democracy’ is possible even without civil liberty. The sort of
democracy in which cit izens passively consume whatever narrowly dif f erentiated polit ical brands the elite
comes up with, making a purchase once every f ew years at election time. Which is to say, a democracy not
unlike the stagnant electoral polit ics of  our own time. Not much independence of  the executive is required
to make the marginal polit ical choices that contemporary voters are f aced with. Perhaps prisoners can be
equal participants in that process. However, a democracy that really aims to achieve the collective self -
government of  the people cannot do without extensive and well-protected civil liberties, because they are
essential to its concept. Freedom f rom executive coercion when debating, associating and assembling in
public, and when deliberating in private, are essential if  cit izens are to thrash out their own understandings
of  the common good, to produce as well as consume policy alternatives, or to hold representatives to
account in the intensive way that ensures that government truly represents the self -determined views of
the people. Only with these f reedoms can the people as a whole aspire to collective self -government.
The enf ranchisers’ argument that civil liberties are not necessary to democratic cit izenship serves to
obscure the imaginative possibility of  representative government as the means to collective self -
determination and to entrench the minimal elit ist concept of  democracy as no more than a choice of
polit ical representatives. Enf ranchisers are quick to point out that the blanket ban on prisoners voting has
some arbitrary ef f ects on polit ical participation. And they are right. Depending on exactly when a prisoner is
sentenced and when an election f alls, some short- term prisoners will not get to vote at an election at which
others’ sentenced to exactly same term will be able to vote. No aspect of  their case better illustrates the
thinness of  the liberal concept of  democracy. A punctilious concern f or equality of  treatment with respect to
voting in a single election covers up the prof oundly subversive ef f ect of  their argument on the already
weakened civil liberties that are the precondition of  actual democratic self -government.
Few sections of  society are in greater need of  a polit ically vigorous, emancipatory practice of  democracy
than those f rom which prisoners tend to come. But even if  we leave aside the long-term damage done to
the polit ical prospects of  the currently powerless, the enf ranchisers’ argument does not unequivocally
serve the cause of  penal ref orm either. Extending the vote to prisoners might help to improve prison
conditions, although in the absence of  wider polit ical change that seems unlikely. Either way, it is likely to
make it harder to achieve the aim of  ‘f ewer people in prison’, as the Howard League’s slogan puts it. To
construct imprisonment as a continuation of  the lif e of  a cit izen is to deny what we ought to emphasise:
that deprivation of  liberty by the state is a severe and traumatic violation of  the normal order of  cit izenship
in a democracy. If  we want to see f ewer people sent to prison, then we need to be clear that imprisonment
itself  is by its nature a coercive denial of  cit izenship rights, and for that reason should be used very
sparingly. It should be restricted to those cases where the of f ender has herself  repudiated democratic
cit izenship rights by deliberate violation of  the cit izenship rights of  others, and has done so in such a grave
or unequivocal way that loss of  liberty is the only response that takes the of f ender ’s actions suf f iciently
seriously.
The tension between a minimalist democratic approach to imprisonment and the current campaign f or
prisoner enf ranchisement is most sharply posed when enf ranchisement is presented as a response to the
f act that imprisonment disproportionately af f ects ethnic minorit ies, or is imposed f or of f ences that should
not be counted as serious public wrongs deserving of  imprisonment. To enf ranchise prisoners because
their imprisonment is a consequence of  racial discrimination is to adapt to that discrimination rather than to
challenge it. The wrongf ully imprisoned should be f reed. The vote is no answer to the injustice of  wrongf ul
imprisonment. On the contrary, the enf ranchisers’ proposition actually succeeds in converting the vote –
the right of  rights – into an insult, to be added to the injury of  being wrongf ully imprisoned.
This then is the democratic argument against prisoner enf ranchisement. It is not the same argument as that
of  the government or the majority at Westminster, who also oppose enf ranchisement. Moreover, the
democratic argument against enf ranchisement has nothing in common with the idea that prisoners should
suf f er ‘civic death’. As I have argued elsewhere, although a prisoner ’s democratic cit izenship is necessarily
suspended by her imprisonment, any system that was serious about collective self -government would be
committed to extending to prisoners as many rights as possible, to ensuring better than decent prison
conditions and to f ostering as much polit ical participation in prisons as is possible within the limits imposed
by prisoners’ loss of liberty. Nor does the democratic argument allow f or US-style f elon disf ranchisement.
Once released f rom executive control, a person is restored to f ull cit izenship. Nor does democracy imply
the loss of  a prisoner ’s right to seek nomination as a candidate and stand f or election, f or that would be
to deny the right of  all cit izens to vote f or whomsoever they wish.
What the democratic argument against enf ranchisement ref uses to do is to f oster the illusion that the
polit ical rights enjoyed by prisoners can be on a par with those enjoyed by the f ree cit izens of  a democratic
republic. By promoting this illusion, the enf ranchisers’ argument is potentially lethal f or the polit ical f reedom
of  all cit izens, including those who have been released f rom prison.
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